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1. Financing the Tokyo Metropolitan Government 
Collapse of Japan's“Bubble Economy" by 1991 and prolonged depression since then have 
directly hit the budget of the Tokyo Metropolitan Govemment (τ'MG). The major revenue source of 
TMG is metropolitan taxes， which account for nearly two-thirds (65.5% in 1997) of its general 
account budget Of the metropolitan taxes， taxes imposed on corporations (corporation inhabitant 
tax and corpor瓜ionenterprise回x)are important revenue sources but their amounts are affected 
by changing business conditions. In 1989， the year when the bubble peaked， the total amount of 
these two corporation-related taxes reached 2，680.1 billion yen， accounting for 56.1% ofTMG's tax 
revenue. By 1998 however， that amount dropped to 1，627.7 billion yen， orto only 38.2% of the total 
tax revenue. Accordingly TMG's total amount of tax revenue decreased from 4，849.4 billion yen in 
1991 to 3，860.1 billion yen凪 1994and continued on to either decline or showing litle increase. 
Contrary to this trend of tax revenue decline， basic financial needs continued to grow. One 
factor contributing to由民increaseis "graying" of Tokyo.官leproportion of senior citizens aged 65 
and over to由etotal population is rapidly increasing from only 4.0%副 1962to 13.3%担 1996.It is 
expected to reach 25.20!O by 2025. 
Another factor is a rising unemployment caused by prolonged recession (rate of unemploy-
ment in Tokyo was 3.1% in 1990， 4.併もin1995and estimated 5.69もinthe mid 1999) and泊cre郎副g
corporate bankruptcies (2，876 cases in 1996 and 3，406 cases血 1998).As the employment system of 
Japanese corporations has been based on life-Iong employment and seniority system，抗isalmost 
impossible for middle-aged workers to get new jobs once they訂efired. 
These factors have urged TMG to increase various kinds of social welfare programs including 
construction of homes for senior citizens and shelters for homeless people. 
In addition， the central govemment encouraged (or say rather forced) local govemments to 
increase their public works spending to stimulate regional economies. The rationale was，“Don't 
worry about the financial resource for issuing local bonds. We the central govemment w立1pay for 
the necessary e}中enditureωaymentof interest and principal redemption) by supplying additional 
Local Allocation T偲 (LAT)".LAT is a fund reserved to secure equitable distribution of financial 
resources among local govemments， and to guarantee execution of nationally standardize 
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percentage of national tax revenues (32.0・32.研6of personal and corporate income tax and liquor 
tax; 24% of consumption tax; and 25% oftobacco阻x)are earmarked for this fund. 
The LAT system was started in 1950 based on recommendations made a year earlier by a 
group of American tax experts led by Professor Carl 8umner 8houp of Columbia University 
(“8houp mission"). The system continued to expand and at present al prefectures， except TMG， 
have come to receive a fair amount of LA T.
TMG has not been entitled to receive LAT as the central government has long regarded抗a
“rich" local govemment where headquaters of large corporations have concentrated. 80 long出
Japan could enjoy high economic growth， this arrangement of not granting LAT worked fme for 
Tokyo. Because of rapidly shrinking tax revenue mentioned earlier however， TMG， who cannot 
cover the shortage by LAT， was forced to issue additional bonds to cover expanding public works 
expenditure. 
During the boom period， TMG did accumulate some reserve funds for rainy days， but after 
exhausting them it kept issuing metropolitan bonds every year to cover deficits. Table 1 shows 
“Outstanding Amount of Metropolitan Bonds" from 1983 to 1997.官lerate of increase was low until 
1992 (total annual increase of a litle over 0.1 trillion yen in the first six ye訂s，and a litle over 
annual 0.3 trillion yen in the next three-year period). However， since 1992 until 1997， that pace 
accelerated to record a one-trillion-yen increase in a single ye低
Table 1 also shows the underwriters of inflating metropolitan bonds. The Trust Fund Bureau is 
a govemment fund consisting of the deposits of Postal 8avings Account， Employees' and People's 
Pension and others which will be explained later.“日nanceCorp. for Public Enterprises"回Table2 
おalsoconsidered a part of government fund. Private fmancial institutions have had confidence in 
Table 1 Outstanding Amount of Metropolitan Bonds 
(in billion yen， %;鉱山eend of fiscal year) 
Total 
byLoaner 
TrustFund 
Bureau 
Public Sub-
scription 
CityBanks 
Others 
Average interest 
rate(%) 
1983(858) 
5，9523 
(100.0) 
1，122.9 
(16.8) 
1，927.5 
(32.4) 
2，376.5 
(39.9) 
7.56 
89(H.1) 92(H.4) 
6，6093 7，773.1 
(100.0) (100.0) 
1，593.1 1，720.2 
(24.1) (22.1) 
2，624.4 2，770.1 
(39.7) (35.8) 
1，429.6 2，028.3 
(21. 7) (26.2) 
6.39 5.87 
93(H.5) 94(H.6) 95(H.7) 96(H.8) 
8，966.1 9，897.8 10，970.9 1，612.7 
(100.0) (100.0) (100.0) (100.0) 
1，972.2 2，007.9 2，572.4 2，689.6 
(22.0) (20.3) (23.5) (23.2) 
2，928.4 3，205.0 3，489.8 3，737.2 
(32.7) (32.4) (31.8) (32.2) 
2，863.0 3，468.6 4，032.4' 4，319.7 
(31.9) (36.8) (36.8) (37.2) 
5.49 5.27 4.90 4.64 
Note: (1)百letotal includes a small amount of short term bonds in addition to the items list疋d.
(2) 1 billion yen = roughly U8$ 9.5 million S: 8howa H: Heisei 
97(H.9) 
12，112.1 
(100.0) 
2，741.8 
(22.6) 
3，985.4 
(32.9) 
4，500.1 
(37.2) 
4.40 
(3) Others include Postal Life Insurance， Finance Corp. for Public Enterprises， Mutual Aid Society. 
(4) Average interest rate for metropolitan bonds 
(5) sources“Tosei Yoran"σokyo St瓜isticalYearbook) 
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TMG's financial power that major lenders (almost three-fourths) include city banks， insurance 
companies， and Employees' Mutual Aid Society. It should be noted that the average interest rate of 
metropolitan bonds was very high before the 1990s (7.56% in 1980 and 6.39% in 1989). 
Consequently， there will be a heavy financial burden of interest payment for the bonds maturing 
between 2010 and 2020. 
Before finding an answer to question whether TMG can continue on its deficit fmance by bond 
issuance， we shall first examine the fmancial condition of other municipal governments. 
2. Local Public Finance is Falling into Debt 
(a)Municipal bonds 
As of the end of March 1998， Japan had in total 3，232 municipalities (670 cities and 2，562 
townsl villages). Table 2 shows the outstanding amount of municipal bonds. Generally speaking， 
their fmancial power and credibility回thecountry's public loan market is not so strong like TMG， 
and have to depend heavily on government funds (e.g. Trust Fund Bureau and Postal Life 
Insurance)， and the Japan Finance Corporation for Municipal Enterprises (Finance Corp. for 
Public Enterprises in Table 2). This corporation is empowered to issue bond to furnish long-term 
(usually 20 to 28 years) loans for local public enterprises such as water supply and sewage works， 
urban transportation facilities，and others. 
The outstanding amount of municipal bonds totaled 54，089.3 billion yen at the end of March 
1998 (the end of fiscal ye訂 1997).As Table 2 shows， until 1990 this outstanding amount increased 
around one trillion yen annually， but since then， between 2 to 4 trillion yen every year. Since the 
Japan Finance Corporation for Municipal Enterprises is a government organization， the national 
Table 2 Outstanding Amount of Municipal Bonds and Their Loaners 
(凪billionyen) 
1988(863) 89(H.1) 90(H.2) 91(H.3) 92 (H.4) 93(H.5) 94(H.6) 95(H.7) 96(H.8) 
Total 26，256.6 27，248.5 28，606.4 30，461.2 33，382.8 36，843.1 41，071.8 46.360.0 50，981.9 
byLoaner 
1. Government 17，728.0 18，187.0 18，698.1 19，339.9 20，421.2 21，915.9 24，141.6 26857.9 29，274.1 
Funds (67.5) (66.7) (65.4) (63.5) (61.4) (59.5) (58.7) (57.9) (57.4) 
a) Trust Fund 10，792.5 10，991.0 1，258.1 1，664.2 12，539.1 13，843.0 15，793.2 18，267.9 20，521.9 
Bureau (41.1) (40.3) (39.4) (38.3) (37.6) (37.6) (38.5) (39.4) (40.3) 
b) Postal 6，933.5 7，196.0 7，440.0 7，675.7 7，882.1 8，072.9 8，348.4 8.589.9 8，752.2 
Insurance (26.4) (26.4) (26.0) (25.2) (23.7) (21.9) (20.3) (18.5) (17.2) 
2. Financial Corp. 
for Public 2，253.5 2，310.1 2，327.9 2，389.1 2，624.1 2，954.8 3，195.1 3，534.6 3，951.0 
Enterprises (11.7) (8.5) (8.1) (7.8) (7.9) (8.0) (7.8) (7.6) (7.7) 
3. City Banks 2，852.6 3，006.2 3，360.7 3，970.4 5，486.9 6，555.2 7，990.7 9，444.6 10，562.0 
(10.9) (11.0) (11. 7) (13.0) (16.4) (17.8) (19.4) (20.4) (20.7) 
4. Public 967.3 1，015.0 1，070.3 1，142.0 1，256.5 1，415.9 1，647.4 1，955.0 2，248.6 
Subscription (3.7) (3.7) (3.7) (3.7) (3.8) (3.8) (4.0) (4.2) (4.4) 
Note: Total include 0出ers.
Source:“Chiho Zaisei Tokei Nempo"(Annual Statistics on Local Public Finance) 
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govemment has actually paid for almost two-thirds of this outstanding amount. 
(b) Prefectural bonds 
Local govemments of Japan consist of municipalities and 47 prefectures (incIuding TMG)，加d
the total outstanding amount of bonds issued by both municipalities and prefectures can be seen in 
Table 3. Again we see that a major p紅 t(51.2% in 1997) has been fmanced by the national govem-
ment (undertaken by funds of the govemment and the Japan Finance Corporation for Municipal 
Enterprises ).官USoutstanding amount has more than doubled within the past 8 years，仕om50.0 
trillion yen担 1988to 111.5 trillion yen in 1997. The sharp increase tells that the local public finance 
is falling into debt. 
Table 3 Outstanding Amount of Local Bonds and Their Loaners 
(in billion yen) 
1988(8臼) 89(H.1) 90但.2) 91(H.3) 92(H.4) 93(H.5) 94(H.6) 95(H.7) 96(H.8) 97(H.9) 
Tota1 50，042.6 52，300.8 55，098.1 58，689.9 65，045.2 72，304.2 80，461.2 94.447.0 104，916.6 111，496.4 
byLoaners 
1. Govemment 26，537.3 27周4.8 29，997.0 30，339.4 32，508.0 35，494.8 38，331.4 43，447.0 47，646.8 49，722.5 
Funds (53.0) (53.1) (52.6) (5l.η (50.0) (印.4) (47.6) (46.1) (45.4) (4.6) 
a) Trust Fund 18，580.7 19，473.5 20，363.6 21，404.4 23，276.8 26，003.0 28，489.9 32，971.7 36，718.5 38，715.0 
Bureau (37.1) (37.2) (37.0) (36.5) (35.8) (36.9) (35.4) (35.0) (35.0) (34.η 
b) Postal Life 7，956.7 8，311.3 8，633.4 8，935.0 9，231.2 9，49 l. 7 9，84l.5 10.475.2 10，928.3 1，007.5 
Insurance (15.9) (15.9) (15.η (15.2) (14.2) (13.5) (12.2) (11.1) (10.4) (9.9) 
2. Japan Finance 3，876.3 3，990.4 4，089.0 4，215.0 4，641.4 5，197.0 5，500.1 6，057.9 6，779.0 7，342.2 
Co. (7.7) (7.6) (7.4) (7.2) (7.1) (7.4) (6.8) (6.5) (6.6) (6.6) 
3. CityBank 10，451.5 10，208.1 10，363.5 1，032.5 13，741.9 18，204.1 23，267.7 289，966.3 33，060.8 36，085.1 
(20.9) (19.5) (18.8) (18.8) 。1.1) (25.8) (28.9) (31.2) (32.0) (32.4) 
4. Public 3，790.4 3，951.9 4，128.3 4，297.1 4，714.6 5，287.6 6，255.2 7，245.6 8，184.5 9，067.5 
Subscription σβ) (7.6) (7.5) (7.3η (7.勾 (7.5) (7.7) (7.8) (7.9) (8.1) 
Note: Total include(5) others. As for others， refer to Table 1 and 2 its note (3); 
Municipal Bonds exclude those of Special Ward (ku) in Tokyo. 
Source: Ministry of Local Affairs“Chiho Zaisei Tokei Nempo" 
( Statistical Data of Local Public Finance) 
(c) The overall picture of local debts 
The 1999 version of“官leWhite Paper on Local Public Finance" published by the Ministry of 
Home Mfairs warned the trend of increasing local debt (Chapter 1， Section 2“Future Financial 
Burden"). It explains that the total amount of local debt is not equal to that of local bonds but in 
addition includes debts related: i) LAT's borrowed money from the national govemment's Trust 
Fund Bureau; i) contract authorization (official prenuse for future payment); iu) deficit financing 
of local public corporations (Chiho Kosha); and iv) the so幽called“thirdsector companies C官urd
Sector)". 
i)LAT's borrowed money 
The first item， or LAT's borrowed money from the national govemment's Trust Fund Bureau， 
iおsshown in Table 4 (“Ne目tDebt 0ぱfLocalGOVI刊er口mr町lID町m陀entωs"
ment叫 encouraged local govemments t旬oincrease their public works spending by pronusing tωos叩up-
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Table 4 Net Debt of Local Governments 
(Ordinary Account; in trilion -1，000 billion-yen) 
1990 1991 
(1) Outstanding 
Amount of local bonds 52.2 54.9 
(2) LAT* Account borrowed 
from FILP料 1.5 0.7 
(3) Public enterprise debt 
(covered by仕leordinary 
account) 13.3 14.4 
Tota1*** 67.0 70.0 
*LAT: Local Allocation T鉱 ornational equalization加 ld
**FIL T: the Fiscal Investment and Loan Program 
1992 
61.1 
2.2 
15.8 
79.1 
1993 1994 1996 1997 
70.5 80.5 103.3 11.5 
3.8 7.4 14.4 15.2 
17.0 18.4 21.4 23.0 
91.3 106.3 139.3 150.0 
*~神Inaddition to仕letotal given here， there are debts related to public enterprises and third sector companies 
Source of出e
port their financing with additional LAT. The amount of LAT account however has become too 
small to supply the necessary白ndwhich forced the national govemment and obliged to borrow 
企omthe Trust Fund Bureau. It is e)中ectedthat the amount of this borrowed money may reach 
30.03 trillion yen at the end of fiscal ye訂 1999.
並)Contract Authorization 
In addition to debt shown in Table 4， we must add items i) to iv) listed above (i.e. Contract 
Authorization with 17.3 trillion yen debt at the end of fiscal year 1997，“Chiho Kosha" and “官lird
8ectorsつpluslocal public enterprises debt not covered by the ordinary account (29.4 trillion yen 
国 1997)and loan by the Japan Finance Corporation for Municipal Enterprises (the gross amount of 
29.0 trillion yen in 1997). 
ii) Chiho Kosha 
Following the example of甲ublicor govemment corporation"血 theU.8.， local govemments 
in Japan introduced this system in the mid-1960s by investing their necessary capital， and hiring 
employees who were treated as semi-govemment officials. Based on three acts， local govemments 
set up three kinds of local public corporations under the name 
S印up卯pl刷yin碍go凹rdeveloping (1) local public h加ou田1路胤S姐i泊ng，(σ2)local public road and (3め)public land . At first 
local govemments invested 100% of their capital， but later certain amount of pri可v-ate(such as bank， 
utility or railway company) money was introduced. As of the beginning of 1996， the number of 
Chiho Kosha to which local govemments invested 1000Al of their capital was 4，125 (770 by prefec-
tures， 219 by designated cities -m司jorcities with population more than 1 million and were allowed 
a certain extent of autonomy， and 3，136 municipalities ). In addition， there were 5，219 Koshas 
financed partly by private money. 
iv)官le“Thlrd8ector" 
8ince the mid-1980s， the Japanese economy e:njoyed high rate of economic expansion ( called 
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the stage of“Bubble Economy") and local governments themselves tried to expand their activities 
efficiently (or say rather speculatively) by inviting private capital and civilian know-how.官lUSthey 
set up semi-public corporations under the name of the “3rd Sectors." After the promulgation of 
“Comprehensive Law to Arrange Health Resort Areas" in 1987， many Third Sectors engaged in 
regional development works in holiday resort areas， and we find many Third Sector type hotels 
accessible by scenic railways or sightseeing roads across the count町. Also because of deficit 
fmancing of the national railway system (the system was privatized in 1987 with 25.5-trillion-yen 
accumulated deficit and this amount with interest eventually reached to 28 trillion yen without pay-
ing out)， many local railways in depopulated紅白wentbankrupt and they were transferred to the 
Third Sectors with financial support from local governments and regional private corporations. 
After Japan's Bubble Economy burst at the beginning of the 1990s， many Third Sectors have 
gone into the red. One example --both City and Prefecture of Miyazaki (located in southern 
崎市shu)jointly established the Phoenix Resort Company (PRC) with 300 million yen capital (each 
government invested 25% of this capital and the remaining amount was financed by the Dai-ichi 
Kangyo Bank and other private regional enterprises). This PRC constructed a 43 -floor high-rise 
beautiful hotel with 750 rooms and many amusement facilities in the 135・hectare(almost 340 
acres) pine forest. The PRC部 wellas the City and the Prefecture e}中ectedto have 5.5 million 
annual吋sitors.While the construction works were going on， the general economic condition 
worsened and， after its opening in 1994， the hotel had only 3.0 million visitors annually which 
caused 20-billion-yen deficit. PRC's accumulated debt including the construction cost has now 
reached 260 billion yen. In 1999 Miyazaki Prefecture decided to spend 6 billion yen out of its bud-
get to cover the deficit， but what should be done for the remaining deficit? 
On Dec.28， 1999 Ministry of Local Affairs reported that the total number of the “Third 
Sectors" w描 8，395加 d，加ofJuly 1st ofthat year， out of 3，475 set up to do businesses， 1，436 (41.3% 
of total) were in the red with a total loss of 220.6 billion yen. Of these deficit-operating sectors 
33.69もengagein sightseeing or leisure business， 14.2%加agriculturalspecial home product， 12.2% in 
transporta 
3. Trust Fund Bureau and Postal Savings System 
As Table 3 shows， the major sources of financing local bonds are “Funds of Trust Fund 
Bureau" and “Postal Life Insurance". In 1997 these two sources covered 44.6% of the outstanding 
amount of local bonds. Table 5 shows出atthe deposit of posta1 savings covers the major part of 
"Fund ofthe Trust Fund Bureau" (238.8trillion yen out of 418.3 trillion yen or 57.1%回 1997).
Post offices handle both postal savings and postallife insurance business in Japan. Compared 
with other countries， Japanese post offices are responsible for a surprisingly huge amount of sav-
ing money. Total 24，638 post offices (as of March 31， 1997) al over the country form the biggest 
financial institution in the world. There町 e，as we know， similar financial institutions such as 
“Sp訂kasse"in Germany or “Caisse d'邑:pargne"in France， but they are a kind of saving or thrift 
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Table 5 Deposits to Fund of the Trust Fund Bureau(Yokinbu Shikin) 
in trilion(I，OOO bilion) yen 
1986(8.61) 89(H.l) 93(H.5) 94(H.6) 95(H.7) 97(H.9) 
(1) Postal savings 101.3 131.3 181.5 195.2 211.6 238.8 
(2) Postallife Insurance & 
Annuity 2.6 4.1 8.0 7.4 8.5 6.0 
(3) Employees' 
Pension 50.3 67.7 96.7 103.0 107.4 124.0 
(4) People's 
Pension 2.5 4.5 7.5 8.2 8.6 9.9 
(5) Total 167.1 230.1 326.3 346.7 373.9 418.3 
Note:“Total include other miscellaneous items. 
8ource:“Ministry of Finance 8tatistics Monthly" July 1999 
institutions for promoting or supporting home ownership or purchasing consumer durable goods. 
In Germany，“Postbank" h部 14，703offices taking care of people's sa吋ng，but由自deposited
money is mainly used for information technology facilities. 
Even a 1訂gebank can open maximum 400 or 500 branch offices， and those only担 urbanized
area. But one of 24，638 post offices over Japan are located回 yourneighborhood， wherever you 
live. It is quite easy for rural villagers to deposit their daily cash income in neighboring post office. 
There is a historical background to this notable financial feat旧 esof post office in Japan. In 
1868 the new Meiji Emperor Govemment replaced the Tokugawa feudal regime to start moderniza-
tion， and attached special importance to constructing and improving nationwide tr鉱山portation
and communication systems. In 1872 the national govemment constructed the country's frst rail-
way between Tokyo and Yokohama， set up a modem-style post office system almost in the same 
year andjoined in the Universal Postal Union in 1877. The govemment appointed its 0百icialsto the 
head of regional higher-ranking post offices， but selected influential community leaders as heads of 
local (called the third class) post offices which were located even in small isolated islands. 
In 1861 England opened the first postal saving system in the world， and Japan adopted this 
system in 1875. Since the Meiji Restoration， the goal of the national govemment was to catch up 
with advanced European countries by accumulating large amount of capital. This postal savings 
money served as an important fmancial source for its industrial and military development. 
To encourage people to be thrift and diligent， the govemment advocated the campaign “Work 
harder and put your saved money in the neighboring post office". In unison with the govemment， 
masters of local post office shouted “No poverty can overtake担dustry.For yo町 futurehappiness， 
save your money to put in post office. Your deposit will be guaranteed by 0町 govemment".“Many
a litle makes a mickle" came true and the postal savings section of the Bureau of Communication 
(organized血 1878)collected farmers' and workers'da立ycash income to build up a mighty public 
負md.
In 1885 this fund was transferred to“Yokinbu" (section of postal sa吋ngs)of the Ministry of 
Finance. Before the 20th century，“Yokinbu" fund was used only to secure national bonds， but国
1907 that function was expanded to include loans t 
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porations went into bankruptcy. Small savers (e.g. farmers， workers and owners of small enterpris帽
es) feared defaults by private banks. In spite of post office 0宜'eringinterest rates lower than those 
in the private sector， these savers put their money into postal savings account for security reason， 
which was then used by the govemment for industrial and military development. 
After the 2nd World War ( in 1951)，“Yokinbu" w部 reorgsanizedand renamed “Trust Fund 
Bureau" (Shikin Unyoubu). Table 5 shows the deposits to this Fund of the Trust Fund Bureau， and 
Table 6 shows the Postal Savings Account. In Table 6，“Ordinary" is equivalent to a demand deposit 
of commercial banks while “Installment" means monthly fixed amount deposit (unit 1，000 yen). 
官lerate of interest fluctuates based on market conditions.“日xed"means deposits担postalsav-
回gsfor a fixed period (maximum ten ye倒的 atcompound担terest，and when出eymature deposi-
tors receive the principal with interest on it. The rate of凪terestis fixed when initial deposits are 
made. Anyone who deposited money before 1990 when出einterest rate was over 6% (see Table 1 
column "Average interest rate" which is roughly the same as the rate applied to postal savings) 
could later expect to receive a significant amount of担terest(Note: the average interest rate fur-
ther declined to below 3% a立er1989). 
Table 6 Postal Saving Account (Deposited at the end of fiscal year) 
(in trilion yen ; concluded) 
1984(S.59) 88(S.63) 92 (H.4) 93(H.5) 95(H.7) 97(H.9) 
1) Ordinary 7.75 8.76 12.48 13.93 15.80 25.60 
2) Installment 0.81 0.78 0.81 0.86 0.85 0.76 
3) Fixed 84.31 116.33 156.78 168.74 180.93 214.17 
Total 93.30 128.11 173.33 186.90 201.22 247.25 
Note: Total includes others; (Savings for home building， for children' education， etc.) S=Showa， H=Heisei 
Source: Special issue on FILP in“Ministηof Finance Statistics Monthly" July 1999ω.59) 
4. Postal Savings Account in Crisis 
Deposited amount of postal savings， guaranteed by the national govemment， increased to 254 
trillion yen (around US$ 2，500 billion) in September 1999. The money served師、malletof luck" 
or“Santa Claus bag，" and whenever politicians wanted to promote public works (highway， air port， 
bridge， dam...) in their constituencies， they could draw money out of this huge bag (0血ciallytaking 
the form of long-term borrowing money -usually 20 to 40 years - through “Ministry of 
Construction"，“Ministry of Home Affairs"，or other ministries). 
However， new crisis is approaching this Postal Savings Account. In September 1990， people 
deposited large amount of money to postal savings -for a ten year period with fixed compound 
rate of 6.33% and they will mature in September 2000 amounting to total 58 trillion yen principal 
and interest. Similar amount was deposited with 6.0% fixed interest rate in July 1991 which will 
mature in July 2001 with total48 trillion yen principal and interest. 
Total106 trillion yen (almostUS$ 1，000 billion) will fal due within a year or so. After deduct-
ing 20%出血teresttax imposed at the source， we expect (or fear) that rou.酔ly81 trillion yen might 
be withdrawn from their postal savings. 
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Optimistic post offices expect around 70% of this 81 trillion yen may be redeposited to th位
savings. But would people be generous enough to redeposit such a huge amount of money to the 
post office again even with current interest rate， say 0.2016 for a three ye訂 period?If you deposit 1 
million yen at compound interest rate of 6%， you can receive 0.76 million yen of回terestafter ten 
years， but in case of 0.2%， you get only 0.016 million (16 thousand) yen within the same period. 
If a half， or even one-third of postal deposited money is withdrawn from the postal savings 
account， there will be a tremendous impact on the country's local bond market. 
5. Toward the Globalization of Local Public Finance 
In order tosolve the deficit百nanc回gof local public finance， we must search for the ways of 
“Globalization." From the viewpoint .of intemational standard， we find it necessary to correct 
some of country's key systems as follows: 
(1) Easy Access to Local Bonds 
As Table 2 and 3 show， the national govemment fund and banks undertake most of local 
bonds and very few individuals or foreign investors own them. If many people invest their saved 
money in local bonds or，部 wesee in many advanced countries， foreign investors buy our local 
bonds， the situation might be quite changed. However， we must solve several problems to achieve 
this goal. 
(2) Strengthen Local Autonomy by Decentralizing Financial Power 
In 1997 net to阻1amount of govemment expenditure (gross total of national general account 
plus those of local govemments without dup1ications) was 148.7 trillion yen. Out of this total 
amount， national govemment net e}中enditurew田 52.3trillion yen (35.2%)加 dthat of local govem-
ments was 96.4 trillion yen (64.8%). The local govemments spend twice as much and thus work 
twice as much回 thecentral govemment. 
However， when we tum to taxes， fundamental independent revenue source of public adminis-
tration， the national vs. local ratio reverses. Out of total 91.8 trillion yen tax paid， national回xes
accounted for 60.6% or 55.6 trillion yen， while the rest， or39.4% (36.2 trillion yen) was paid as local 
阻xes.Thus local govemments have to rely heavily on national financial support， inthe form of 
transfers and gran臼，to execute their duties. 
At present our national govemment is implementing a program to decentralize administrative 
functions. Even though many functions carried out by the national govemment are being trans-
ferred to local govemments， financial resources are sti1l being controlled at the centrallevel. Local 
govemments cannot handle 1訂geramount of works and services without money and thus have to 
rely more on the national financial support. 
We must admit the fact that Japan's local autonomous power is stil weak and precarious. 
People do not pay much attention to local a首airsand they are not accustomed to invest their saved 
money into local bonds. Similarly， Japan's local bonds are not a main target for foreign investors at 
present. 
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(3) Globalization of Local Budgetary System 
From now on Japan's local public finance should be fully understandable not only for domes-
tic people， but also for international investors. International standards are being applied to our 
business accounting systems --仕omthe ones based on acquisition price to market price and oth-
ers. Similarly， our local budgetary system should introduce a form of balance sheet showing the 
whole picture of local government financial conditions.官leexisting system based on cash (not 
accrual) tels only a part of borrowed money and does not clarify assessed value of public facilities 
(fixed assets).The relation among different accounts -general， public enterprises， Chiho Kosha加 d
出eThird Sector companies， and how much the total deficit a local govemment has， are not clear 
under the current annual financial reports. It might be necessary to introduce a concept of “consol-
idated balance sheet" to public fmance. Just like “consolidated statement of shareholders' equity" 
published by private companies， local governments can prepare “consolidated statement of taxpay-
ers' eq凶ty".百leserepo此sshould also help foreign people， investors in p訂tic叫.ar，to get a clearer 
picture of Japan's local fmance. 
One item that has long been neglected in local public finance is“depreciation reserves."官邸
is due to the historical background that most of public in企astructureand facilities in m司jorcities 
(except ancient capital cities of Kyoto and Nara) were bombed and destroyed during the Second 
World War. Many of them were rebu誼tduring the period of high econo凶 cgrowth and there has 
been no or litle need to worry about renewing or maintaining brand-new city halls， highways， 
bridges， sewer pipes or public oncert halls. 
However， many of these facilities and buildings have been used for over 30 years and a need to 
supply maintenance and repair costs for them is arising. The ordinary accounts of local public 
finance does have “Maintenance Cost" item whose amount occupies 1.1% of the total expenditure 
担 1997but not “Depreciation Expenses." According to the Ministry of Local Affairs'“τ'heWhite 
Paper on Local Public Finance"， depreciation expenses are included in “Reserve Funds" together 
with local bonds sinking fund， retirement allowances and others， but the amount of Reserve Funds 
has decreased from 20.7 trillion yen in 1992 to 16.5 trillion yen加 1997.
We should introduce a global standard to our local budg 
Intemational Federation of Accountants; Public Sector Committee 
Governmental Accounting Standards Boards (U.S.) 
Ce抗出edInstitutes of Public Finance and Accountancy (V.K.) 
Public Sector Accounting Standards Boards (Australia) 
Accounting Research Standards Bo紅白(NewZealand) 
Canadian Institutes of Chartered Accountants (Canada) 
At the same t加 eour local finance experts should examine and develop methods to properly 
部 sessthe value of public infrastructure， and to forecast interest rates to properly accumulate 
depreciation reserves， annuity and retirement allowances and others. By referring to repo此;spub-
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lished by the above institutes， we should make our loca1 budgetary system a globa1 one. At the 
same time，抗isnecessary for our loca1 finance experts to discuss proper ways of assessing public 
road， a吋rginforest or forecasting the interest rate in case of accumulating depreciation reserves， 
annuity and retirement a1lowances，etc. 
(4) Citizens' Participation in Local Affairs 
The globa1 budgetary system of our loca1 public finance would make it easier for both commu-
nity residents and foreign investors to better understand the loca1 finance. 
If more and better-to-understand information is provided， citizens will be more interested in， 
andw出bew剖台湾toparticipate in loca1 affairs. Lοca1 autonomy can only be strengthened through 
citizens' active involvement. It should be noted that efficient and competitive loca1 government can 
only be created through a collective effort of the govemment itself and the citizens. 
